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THE EMERGENCE OF "LAW CONSULTANTS"
Tanina Rostain*
INTRODUCTION
In May 2006, Kroll, a global risk consulting firm, announced that
Kathleen Bisaccia, a senior attorney in the Enforcement Division of the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), was joining the firm as Managing
Director of its Business Intelligence and Investigations Division., Ms.
Bisaccia, the press release stated, was responsible for conducting corporate
internal investigations in all areas of federal securities laws. As Kroll's
Web site emphasizes, the firm does not offer legal services. 2 According to
the firm, Ms. Bisaccia was not practicing law in her new capacity, but
working as a consultant.
A year earlier, HR Magazine, a periodical for human resources
professionals, published an article touting a "new breed" of employment
lawyers-employment law consultants. 3 According to the article, recent
developments in employment law have put the onus on employers to focus
on preventive and investigative procedures in connection with potential
discrimination and sexual harassment claims.4 Given these developments,
the article advised employers to consider hiring employment law
consultants as an alternative to traditional counsel. As the article suggested,
law consultants, who have legal training and employment practice
experience, are especially well suited to offer employee training and engage
in internal investigations. 5
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. Thanks to Elizabeth Chambliss, Tai-Heng
Cheng, Denny Curtis, Stephen Ellmann, Diane Fahey, Bruce Green, Seth Harris, Kim
Krawiec, Beth Noveck, Mitt Regan, Judith Resnik, Meg Reuter, and Richard Schottenfeld
for helpful conversation and suggestions on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Rosalie Sanderson
for her tireless efforts in locating sources.
1. Press Release, Kroll, Inc., Senior SEC Enforcement Official Joins Kroll's San
Francisco Office (May 1, 2006), available at
http://www.krollworldwide.com/news/releases/index.aspx?id 13523.
2. See id. (indicating that Kroll does not perform legal work).
3. Michael Sullivan & Carrie Garcia, Under a Different Shingle: There's a New Breed
of Employment Lawyer in the Market-The Employment Law Consultant, HR Magazine,
Mar. 2005, at 119.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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It is too soon to tell whether these stories are a harbinger of widespread
change in the legal profession, 6 but their appearance does coincide with
other signs that various forms of consulting among lawyers are on the rise.
During the last decade, law firms have begun to offer an array of nonlawyer
consulting services alongside traditional legal services. 7  There is also
evidence that some lawyers are going a step further, eschewing traditional
lawyer-client relationships and the organizational umbrella of law firms to
join consulting and professional service firms or put out their own shingles
as "law" consultants. Lawyers who work at corporate risk management
firms and employment law consultants appear to represent two such
consulting subspecialties. These lawyers offer investigative, compliance,
and other law-related services outside the confines of the attorney-client
relationship.
In calling their services consulting, lawyers are joining the large cadre of
nonlawyer consultants who, since the mid-twentieth century, have advised
business on an array of problems. Business consulting today includes
managerial, compliance, investigative, computer, creativity, and risk
assessment consulting. While these services involve varied types of
specialized knowledge, a common characteristic is the fundamentally
contractual nature of the relationship with clients. Unlike traditional
professions such as medicine and law, consulting is not regulated by the
state. Consultants do not have to satisfy educational or other licensing
requirements; nor are they governed by enforceable codes of ethics or
subject to meaningful malpractice liability.
In marketing their services under a consulting model, lawyers are
decoupling their legal expertise from traditional professional institutions
and, in particular, those that attach to the representation of clients. 8 Law
consultants do not practice law; rather, they market their knowledge and
skills outside the framework of attorney-client relationships. Lawyers-by-
6. There appear to be no systematic data on how many law-trained professionals are
framing their services as consulting services; nor is it easy to determine what specific
services fall under this term. In my research,, I did not come across any cases or ethics
opinions involving law consultants, other than those dealing with lawyers acting as expert
witnesses. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. Currently, there are no published
studies of lawyers in alternative or hybrid careers.
7. See Robert W. Denney, Law Firm Diversification, in Stephen J. McGarry,
Multidisciplinary Practices and Partnerships: Lawyers, Consultants and Clients § 8.01
(Stephen J. McGarry ed., 2002); see also Robert Eli Rosen, "We're All Consultants Now":
How Change in Client Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of
Corporate Legal Services, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 637 (2002). An analogous trend among lawyers
can be detected in connection with the rise of the abusive tax shelter market. During the
market's peak at the end of the twentieth century, significant numbers of tax lawyers joined
accounting firms, investment banks, and specialized boutiques not to practice law, but to
design tax shelter "products" intended for sale to high wealth individuals and
corporations. See Tanina Rostain, Travails in Tax: KPMG and the Tax Shelter Controversy,
in Legal Ethics: Law Stories 89, 90-91 (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban eds., 2006).
8. Professional institutions are the formal rules, informal norms, and organizational
structures that characterize the legal profession. See generally Eliot Freidson, Professional
Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (1986).
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training have long been members of management consulting firms such as
McKinsey & Company and Booze, Allen & Hamilton. 9 But today's law
consultants, unlike managerial consultants, provide services that bear
significant similarities to services provided by lawyers within attorney-
client relationships.
The discussion below explores the regulatory incentives that may make
law consulting an increasingly attractive model within which to market
legal expertise. The first section places law consulting in the larger context
of business consulting and the compliance industry. The next section
speculates on why law consulting may be on the rise. In certain spheres of
business activity, the benefits of the attorney-client relationship may be
diminishing. In particular, for corporate clients, the value of retaining
counsel may be decreasing with the weakening of the protections afforded
by the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. In addition,
positive benefits flow to corporations from hiring a law consultant rather
than retaining a lawyer. Because law consultants position themselves
outside the regulatory framework that governs attorney-client relationships,
clients can use them in ways that they cannot use traditional counsel. Most
significantly, they can avoid rules intended to protect employees and other
third parties. From the perspective of law consultants, opting out of client
representation gives them the freedom to move unhindered in the private
market for legal services. Because they are not engaging in client
"representation," their obligations to clients are principally defined through
contract, and they can argue that they are not bound by the broad fiduciary
duties that apply to attorney-client relationships, nor subject to malpractice
liability.
The conclusion considers some of the normative implications of law
consulting. Because no systematic data exist, it is too early in my view to
take a strong normative stance. (Among other things, we do not know
whether law consulting is on the rise, whether it is a unified phenomenon,
as I suggest here, or whether it has the characteristics I propose.) It is
important, nevertheless, to consider what effects law consulting might have
on the interests and values that professional regulation is intended to
protect. Law consulting appears to pose minimal risk to corporate clients,
who are typically sophisticated purchasers of legal and law related services.
As corporations have insisted, they are capable of safeguarding their own
interests through appropriate contractual provisions. A more serious
concern is how third parties will fare under a law consultant regime, but one
that is likely to be difficult to address.
The effects of a law consulting regime on law compliance within
corporations are also an important consideration. Professional regulation
and the institutions of law practice in which the rules are imbedded are in a
9. From early on, managerial consulting firms have included lawyers among their
partners and recruited among law school graduates. See infra note 17 and accompanying
text.
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loose way supposed to foster lawyers' commitment to an internal
perspective in law. 10  Whether law consultants are less likely than
traditional corporate lawyers to care about the public values embodied in
law is unclear. It is tempting to think that the decision to opt out of the
regulatory framework that governs legal practice is evidence that law
consultants are in effect adopting a "Holmesian" bad man approach that
focuses on "risk management" over compliance with law in a fuller-or
"Fuller's"--sense. 1" But the rise of compliance consulting suggests a more
complicated picture. The types of compliance mechanisms and modalities
called for under new regulatory regimes-and the interdisciplinary
discourses they generate-undermine the distinction between the internal
and external perspective in law. Consequently, whether law consultants
(and other corporate actors charged with overseeing compliance) are taking
an internal or external perspective is probably beside the point. The
benefits and harms of law consulting are part of the larger question--
currently hotly debated in legal academic circles-of whether compliance
regimes themselves are effective in inducing corporations to engage in
meaningful compliance with legal mandates. 12
I. BUSINESS CONSULTING
A. The Professionalization of Managerial Consulting
Management consulting, the most successful and deeply entrenched form
of business consulting in the world, emerged in the United States to take
advantage of market opportunities created by legislation enacted in the
10. Or so several participants in this Symposium would argue. See, e.g., William H.
Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the Business
Lawyer, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1453 (2006); W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens, and the
Internal Point of View, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1473 (2006).
11. See Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer
Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev., 1273, 1280-88 (1998); see also David Luban, Asking the
Right Questions, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 839 (1999).
12. Some scholars have applauded the proliferation of compliance mechanisms (and a
compliance industry to implement them) as part of a new "soft law" approach to corporate
regulation, under which regulated entities are motivated to internalize legal mandates. See,
e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation
Debate (1992); David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian'" Paradigm in Environmental
Regulation, 2000 I1. L. Rev. 35 (2000); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and
Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 875 (2003); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (2000); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001).
Others are more skeptical of these claims, raising questions about their empirical validity.
See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller & lona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and
the Managerialization of Law, 106 Am. J. Soc. 1589 (2001); Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S.
Erlanger & John Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Rights in the
Workplace, 27 Law & Soc'y Rev. 497 (1993); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance
and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487, 497 (2003); John R.
Sutton et al., The Legalization of the Workplace, 99 Am. J. Soc. 944 (1994).
[Vol. 751400
THE EMERGENCE OF "LA W CONSULTANTS"
wake of the Great Depression. 13  As Christopher McKenna has
documented, after the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, 14 commercial
banks were required to abandon nonbanking activities, including
consultative and reorganizational activities. While investment banks were
not prohibited from engaging in management consulting, SEC regulations
required underwriters to obtain external due diligence on securities issues
and reorganizations. Accounting firms, meanwhile, were prohibited from
engaging in certain activities that undermined their capacity to perform
independent audits.' 5  This legal landscape created an opening for
management consulting to emerge. Beginning in the mid-1930s,
management consulting firms significantly expanded and grew in number. 16
During subsequent decades, these firms, which began as partnerships
among lawyers, accountants, and engineers, were routinely retained by
executives of American companies to conduct studies of organization,
strategy, and operations.1 7 American consulting firms, led by McKinsey &
Company, Booze, Allen & Hamilton, and Cresap, McCormick & Paget, had
a hand in reorganizing the largest companies of the day, pioneering such
organizational and managerial innovations as corporate divisions and
"corporate culture."' 18 By the mid-1960s, these firms dominated the world
for business advice, having played a central role in the Americanization of
international corporations.' 9
In contrast to the established professions, managerial consultants not only
did not seek a monopoly from the state to regulate entry into the profession,
they actively opposed state certification and other formal barriers to entry. 20
Consultants achieved status not as members of a specific profession but as
members of particular firms. 21 As their importance as business advisors to
corporate America grew, elite consulting firms elected informal processes
of credentialing that relied on firm-wide standards of ethics and
competence. As McKenna observes, "[P]rofessional prestige within
management consulting accrued not to individual consultants, but to the
prestigious firms that enforced high standards." 22
Having earlier resisted licensure, management consultants were
subsequently unable to control which advisors held themselves out as
consultants. Without a regulatory monopoly, managerial consultants did
13. See Christopher D. McKenna, The World's Newest Profession: Management
Consulting in the Twentieth Century 62-63 (2006) [hereinafter The World's Newest
Profession]; Christopher D. McKenna, The Origins of Modern Management Consulting, 24
Bus. & Econ. Hist. 51, 54-55 (1995).
14. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (repealed in part 1999).
15. The World's Newest Profession, supra note 13, at 17.
16. Id. at 17-19.
17. Id. at 113-14. Leading consulting firms also imported their managerial and
organizational expertise into government agencies and nonprofits. See id. at 111-14.
18. Id. at 192-94.
19. See id. at 181-86.
20. Id. at 198-99.
21. See id. at 198-203.
22. Id. at 199; see also id. at 192-215.
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not have the power to limit what types of services fell under the consulting
mantle. As the market for specialized knowledge shifted to other areas
during the latter part of the twentieth century, the term "consulting" was
appropriated by other groups to characterize the sale of expertise unbundled
from the provision of goods and services. During the 1990s, computer
support specialists turned into "computer consultants;" stockbrokers
became "financial consultants;" and a variety of other providers of business
advice adopted the consultant title.
B. The Rise of the Compliance Consulting Industry
1. Regulatory Compliance Regimes
The rise of the compliance consulting industry dates to the promulgation
of the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSGs) in 1991.23
Before the 1990s, compliance had been an episodic and industry-specific
focus in business. With the passage of the OSGs, which set forth a
schedule of sentences for corporations convicted of federal crimes, the
implementation of internal compliance programs became an abiding
corporate concern. 24  Under the guidelines, "an effective program to
prevent and detect violations of [the] law" substantially mitigates the
penalties imposed on companies convicted of a crime. 2 5 The guidelines set
forth steps for designing, implementing, and operating an effective
compliance program. These include establishing standards and procedures,
designating compliance personnel and allocating resources, communicating
compliance standards, disciplining failures to comply or oversee
compliance, and regularly updating the compliance program. 26 During the
last fifteen years, a host of compliance professionals, including lawyers and
ethics consultants, have developed services that tailor these broad mandates
to different types of organizations operating in different industries.
Although the OSGs were the first and most important incentive for the
adoption of internal compliance mechanisms, there have been similar
developments in a variety of regulatory settings. In recent years, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) have developed self-audit policies that
encourage the implementation of compliance programs to deal with
23. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 56 Fed. Reg.
22,762 (May 16, 1991).
24. See Corporate Compliance Comm., Am. Bar Ass'n (ABA) Section of Bus. Law,
Corporate Compliance Survey, 60 Bus. Law. 1759 (2005) [hereinafter Corporate
Compliance Survey]. The origins of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines date to the
"defense contracting scandal of the mid- 1980s." See Krawiec, supra note 12, at 497.
25. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C4.1.1 (2004).
26. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2. 1; see also In re Caremark Int'l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969-70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that the failure to
implement a compliance program may constitute a breach of a director's fiduciary
obligations).
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environmental and workplace risks.27  The USA Patriot Act requires
financial institutions to establish anti-money laundering programs. 28 The
Health Information Protection Act (HIPA) requires health care providers to
develop compliance programs to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity,
and security of health information. 29 SEC regulations require investment
companies and advisors to implement compliance programs designed to
prevent violations of the securities laws.30 Under Department of Justice
(DOJ) policy, the existence of a compliance program before an alleged
criminal violation or the implementation of one afterwards are factors in the
Department's decision to charge a company for criminal violations by their
employees or agents. 31
Internal compliance mechanisms gained added momentum with the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Under the Act, a public
company is required, for example, to disclose information about its internal
controls over financial reporting, the company's conduct, its ethics codes,
and the structure of its audit committee. 32  The statute also requires
companies to install whistleblower protections, including confidential
mechanisms for employees to be able to report suspected fraud. 33
A parallel trend has occurred in case law interpreting federal
antidiscrimination provisions. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the
existence of a compliance program can in certain circumstances function as
a defense to punitive damages for violations of federal discrimination law
27. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000) (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
regulations); Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention
of Violation, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995) (same); see also Final Policy Concerning
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Treatment of Voluntary Employer
Safety and Health Self-Audits, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,498, 46,502 (July 28, 2000); U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Audit Policy,
www.epa.gov/compliance/incentives/auditing/auditpolicy.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
For comprehensive surveys of compliance regimes, see Corporate Compliance Survey,
supra note 24; Krawiec, supra note 12, at 510-15.
28. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(2) (Supp. 12001).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-2(d)(2); 1320d-5(b)(3)(A); Health Insurance Reform: Security
Standards, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164 (2006); Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information, id. §§ 160, 164.
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2005); id. § 275.206(4)-7.
31. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder to All Heads of
Department Components and U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against
Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7262, 7264, 7265 (Supp. II 2002); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.308,
229.401, 229.406 (2005).
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1. Various private entities have also enacted compliance
standards. See Corporate Compliance Survey, supra note 24, at 1776-79. For example, the
New York Stock Exchange requires member organizations to promulgate codes of conduct
that cover not only senior officers but also directors and employees of the company. See id.
at 1777.
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under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 34 In a similar vein, the Court has held
that in certain supervisory hostile environment cases, an employer can
escape liability by showing that it exercised reasonable care to prevent
harassment. 35 One factor that goes toward establishing this defense is the
existence of antiharassment policies and internal complaint procedures.
2. The Compliance Industry
The onus on companies to develop internal compliance structures to
address various regulatory agendas has given rise to a bewildering array of
compliance consulting services. The large professional service firms
established themselves in the "ethics consulting" market soon after the
promulgation of the OSGs in the early 1990s. 36 More recently, they have
emphasized compliance services related to financial regulation. In the late
1990s, for example, they significantly expanded their regulatory-
compliance consulting groups to address the needs of financial services
firms to implement compliance systems under increasingly complex
securities laws.37 After the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, these firms have
underscored services related to compliance with Section 404, which
requires effective controls over financial reporting.38 As KPMG's Web site
notes, regulatory compliance mandates call for the expertise of
34. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999). Employers can rely on
the existence of a compliance program to demonstrate good faith to avoid punitive damages
based on the actions of agents acting within the scope of their employment.
35. Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998). This defense is only available in cases in which the
harassment did not result in a tangible employment action, such as firing, demotion, or
reduction of pay. A showing that the employer exercised reasonable care-in effect had an
appropriate compliance program-is a necessary but not sufficient condition to establish this
defense. The defense fails if the victim availed herself of the program and the program
proved ineffective.
36. See Lynnette Khalfani, As Employers Focus on Ethics Training Cottage Industry for
Consultants Grows, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1996, at B4; Kimberly Reeves, Corporate Ethics
Policies Needed in Modern Business, Av-stin Bus. J. Nov. 14, 1997, available at
http://austin.bizjoumals.com/austin/stories/1997/11/17/focus7.html. The emergence of the
compliance industry is illustrated in the career trajectory of Winthrop Swenson, former
Deputy General Counsel to the Federal Sentencing Commission. Mr. Swenson played a
central role in the development of the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSGs),
chairing the staff task force advisory committee that drafted the guidelines. In 1996, he left
the government to join KMPG's i.new compliance/consulting practice. See Compliance
Systems Legal Group, About Our Firm, Attorney Bios, Winthrop M. Swenson, Partner,
http://www.cslg.com/swenson.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). When he joined KPMG, the
firm's compliance services were industry specific and dispersed throughout the organization.
Telephone Interview with Winthrop M. Swenson, Partner, Compliance Systems Legal
Group, in Warwick, RI (Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Swenson Interview].
37. See Paul Beckett, Accountants Boost Consulting Services on Complying with
Securities Laws, Wall St. J., July 20, 1998, at B5.
38. See, e.g., KPMG, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404,
http://www.kpmg.com/Services/Advisory/RAS/Services/RCS/RServices/Sox404.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2006); PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance,
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/BE3AE945AE3901 F085257013005ADD5E
(last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
[Vol. 751404
THE EMERGENCE OF "LA W CONSULTANTS"
multidisciplinary teams with industry specific knowledge. 39 By far the
largest players in this market, the Big Four firms also seek to address
companies' other compliance needs, offering investigative and industry
specific services that include compliance consulting for the health care,
telecommunications, and utilities industries.40
Competing with the professional service firms are a slew of smaller-
some much smaller-consulting groups. Some of these firms have
positioned themselves as "ethics consultants." In 2006, two lawyers with
corporate and employment law practice experience launched the Business
Ethics Consulting Group, which offers companies assistance in
implementing ethics programs.4 1 Whether such small firms will succeed is
unclear, but their appearance suggests that their founders believed that the
market for ethics services will continue to grow. Other firms, such as
Ethics Point and Global Compliance Services, have specialized in offering
confidential hotline services, based in internet capabilities, to field and
follow up on employee complaints and tips. Hotline providers have
enjoyed significant growth since the whistleblower protections in Sarbanes-
Oxley were enacted. 42 Employment law consulting firms, for their part,
seek to combine human resources and employment law expertise to address
companies' compliance needs in the employment area, providing diversity
and sexual harassment training and investigative services.4
3
39. See KPMG, supra note 38; see also KPMG, ERP Controls Integration: Sustaining
Compliance While Implementing Change (2006), available at
http://www.kpmg.com/NR/rdonlyres/2FF8A99F-7375-46AB-BOE9-9D9B9365ED67/0/Cont
rolslntegration.pdf (describing integration of controls into software installation or upgrade).
40. See, e.g., Deloitte & Touche LLP, Regulatory Consulting for the Life Sciences and
Health Care Industry, http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/section-node/0%2C1O42%2Csid%25253
Dl15213%2C00.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006); Deloitte & Touche LLP, Regulatory
Consulting for the Technology, Media, and Telecommunications Industry,
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/sectionnode/0 ,1042,sid%253D1 15215,00.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 2006); Deloitte & Touche LLP, Regulatory Consulting for the Utilities,
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/sectionnode/0%2C 1042%2Csid%25253D 115216%2C00.html
(last visited Nov. 8, 2006); KPMG, Fraud and Misconduct, http://www.kpmg.com/
Services/Advisory/FAS/Issues/Fraud/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). Describing its compliance
services broadly, KPMG's Web site advertises "compliance health checks and reviews," and
"help[ing] management reduce the risk of regulatory intervention." See KPMG, Regulatory
& Compliance Services, http://www.kpmg.com/Services/Advisory/RAS/Services/RCS/RCS.
htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2006). In a similar vein, PriceWaterhouseCoopers offers
"independent assurance of regulatory compliance" and "assessment[s] of [a company's]
current and future regulatory risk profile and impact of new regulations." See
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Regulatory Compliance and Reporting, http://www.pwc.com/
extweb/service.nsf/docid/D9DDD3F7AF139A8085257013005A395D (last visited Nov. 8,
2006).
41. See Business Ethics Consulting Group, About Us,
http://www.businessethicsconsulting.com/about.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006); Business
Ethics Consulting Group, Business Ethics, http://www.businessethicsconsulting.com/
services.html#ethics (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
42. See James C. Hyatt, Birth of the Ethics Industry, Bus. Ethics Online, Summer 2005,
http://www.business-ethics.com/currentissue/summer_2005_birth.html.
43. See Sullivan & Garcia, supra note 3. During the last few years, several
organizations of compliance specialists have appeared. They include the Society of
14052006]
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The prompt investigation of suspected or alleged employee wrongdoing
is an important dimension of a compliance program. Arguing that
corporate investigations are better outsourced than conducted in house or by
a company's lawyer, risk management firms have occupied a fast-growing
niche in this area. Kroll, a leader in risk management services, was founded
by a former prosecutor in 1972 and developed a global presence providing
investigative due diligence on behalf of corporate clients engaged in
mergers and acquisitions during the 1980s. 44  Through a series of
acquisitions in the 1990s, Kroll expanded into a full service global risk
management firm. Today, it offers forensic accounting, background
screening, drug testing, security engineering, corporate advisory and
restructuring, and electronic-data recovery services.4 5  Its nearly four
thousand employees include former prosecutors, CIA and FBI agents, and
private investigators, accountants, and information technology specialists. 46
As part of its business advisory services, Kroll provides "independent and
objective" investigations into suspected employee wrongdoing and fraud.47
In 2004, the corporate intelligence industry was estimated to be a one
Corporate Compliance & Ethics (SCCE), an international nonprofit organization launched in
the early 2000s, which sponsors a yearly institute dedicated to addressing emerging
compliance issues. See Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics,
http://www.corporatecompliance.org/events/events.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). In 2006,
the SCCE for the first time offered an exam to become a "Certified Compliance and Ethics
Professional" (CCEP). See Press Release, Soc'y of Corporate Compliance and Ethics,
Certification for Fast-Growing Compliance and Ethics Profession Available in September
2006 (July 13, 2006), available at http://www.corporatecompliance.org/about/pdfs/2006/
PRcertificationCCEP.pdf. According to the society, a CCEP is a "professional with
knowledge of relevant regulations and expertise in compliance processes sufficient to assist
corporate industries to understand and address legal obligations and promote organizational
integrity through the operation of effective compliance programs." Id. By offering
certification, the SCCE is providing a market advantage to compliance consultants who can
demonstrate expertise. It is also enhancing its own status by becoming a credentialing
institution.
Smaller compliance service firms may be able to compete with the large professional
services firms because of recently enacted limits on the non-audit services that accountants
are permitted to provide to their audit clients under Sarbanes-Oxley. See Strengthening the
Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, Securities Act Release No.
8183, Exchange Act Release No. 47,265, Public Utility Holding Co. Act Release No.
27,642, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 249, and 274
(2003)), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm.
44. See Kroll, Inc., History, http://www.kroll.com/about/history (last visited Nov. 7,
2006) [hereinafter Kroll, History].
45. Id. In 2004, Kroll, Inc. was acquired by Marsh & McLennan Companies and
became one of its operating units. When Marsh ran into regulatory and legal difficulties in
2004, Michael Cherkavsky, the former CEO of Kroll, was named the president and CEO of
Marsh. See Press Release, Marsh & McLennan Cos., Jeffrey W. Greenberg Resigns as
Chairman and CEO of MMC Michael Cherkavsky Named President and CEO (Oct. 25,
2004), available at http://www.mmc.com/news/pressReleases-209.pdf.
46. See Kroll, History, supra note 44.
47. Kroll offers investigative services in areas such as civil and criminal fraud,
management/employee fraud and theft, electronic crimes, secret commissions and kickbacks,
and criminal defense investigations. See Kroll, Inc., Investigations, Financial Advisory, and
Intelligence, http://www.kroll.com/services/ifai/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
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hundred billion dollar business.48 The success of Kroll and competing
investigative firms has spawned several recent entrants into this market.49
Compliance consulting-like consulting more broadly-is not a focus of
professional regulation. Compliance consultants and their clients define the
formal relationships between them contractually. Typically, terms of
engagement cover the scope of services and include general guarantees of
confidentiality and protections of clients' intellectual property, as well as
limits on consultants' liability.50
3. The Porous Boundaries Between Law Practice and Compliance
Consulting
Compliance consultants-both those with and without a law degree-
take the position that they can opt out of the regulatory regime that governs
law practice, because they do not represent clients. To avoid any
appearance to the contrary, compliance consulting firms emphasize that
they offer consulting and not legal services, and lawyers working at such
firms take pains to avoid any suggestion that they are providing legal
advice.5 1  They do not provide legal opinions, nor do they identify
themselves as lawyers. 52
Although compliance consultants do not hold themselves out to be
practicing law, some of their services bear more than a passing resemblance
to activities traditionally considered law practice and, in particular, the
provision of legal advice. Yet, with one exception, there have been no
publicized complaints that compliance consultants are involved in the
unauthorized practice of law or, in the case of those licensed to practice in
the state in which they offer services, are in violation of ethics rules.5 3 The
48. See Thor Valdmanis, Sleuthing Comes to This Pair Naturally, Investigators Keep
Their Firm Lean, Mean, U.S.A. Today, Oct. 11, 2004, at B6.
49. Other risk consulting firms include Vance International, Inc., formally DSFX and
now a division of Garda, see Vance Int'l, Inc., http://www.vanceglobal.com/ (last visited
Nov. 24, 2006), and two newer firms, Fortress Global Investigations and Citigate Global
Intelligence & Security. See New International Security Solutions Company Formed by
High-Profile Former FBI and CIA Officials, Prosecutors, PR Newswire Ass'n, Mar. 13,
2003; Edward J. Kuriansky Joins Citigate Global Intelligence and Security, Bus. Wire., May
29, 2002. Vance offers internal corporate investigations as well as employment law
consulting and other services. See Vance Int'l, Inc., Services, Investigations,
http://www.vanceglobal.com/whatwedo/services/investigation/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
50. Swenson Interview, supra note 36.
51. See, e.g., Press Release, Kroll, Inc., supra note 1. The most cautious firms, while
listing the educational background and legal experience of their lawyer employees, do not
list their Juris Doctor degree after their name. See, e.g., Kroll, Inc., Kathleen Bisaccia,
http://www.kroll.com/services/ifai/professionalsibisaccia/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2006); Kroll,
Inc., Robert Brenner, http://www.kroll.con/services/ifai/professionalsIbbrenner/ (last visited
Nov. 7, 2006).
52. Swenson Interview, supra note 36.
53. If a nonlawyer engages in the provision of legal services, she is subject to
prosecution for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, which is prohibited in all
states. See ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyers' Responsibility for Client Protection, 1994
Survey on the Unauthorized Practice of Law Nonlawyer Practice (1996) (surveying
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absence of attempts by the bar or courts to locate compliance within the
boundaries of law practice is rooted in the history and policy underlying
prohibitions against unauthorized practice as well as the multidisciplinary
expertise often required by regulatory compliance mandates.
Prohibitions against unauthorized practice initially targeted nonlawyers
who appeared in court on behalf of clients. 54 During the 1930s, the scope
of unauthorized practice was expanded to encompass the preparation of
legal documents and the provision of legal advice. 55 Historically, the
organized bar has justified its efforts to limit the practice of law to lawyers
on the ground that this restriction furthered the public interest. According
to the bar, lay people needed to be protected from unethical and
incompetent conduct by individuals who were purporting to provide legal
services without meeting the bar's high standards for competence and
ethics. 56  In other words, the justification for unauthorized practice
restrictions is that they are needed to address the market failure that stems
from individual clients' incomplete knowledge about the type of service
they need or quality of service they are receiving. This rationale does not
carry over easily to the corporate consumer context. Not surprisingly, there
have been few, if any, cases involving claims that nonlawyers were
impermissibly providing legal services to corporations, even during active
periods of unauthorized practice enforcement. In general, corporate clients
are presumed to make sophisticated choices about the legal and law-related
services they need. 57
definitions of "practice of law" in fifty states). These prohibitions cover unlicensed persons
as well as lawyers who are not licensed in the state. If a lawyer licensed in a state engages in
law practice with a nonlawyer, she is subject to ethical prohibitions against assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, see Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 5.5 (2005), and to
prohibitions against sharing fees or becoming partners with nonlawyers. See Model Rules of
Prof I Conduct R. 5.4; see also infra note 109-1 11 and accompanying text. The exception
was a complaint against two of the big professional service firms in 1997. That year, the
Texas Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee launched an investigation to determine
whether Arthur Andersen and Deloitte & Touche were engaged in unauthorized practice of
law in connection with their tax advisory services. See Elizabeth MacDonald, Texas Probes
Andersen, Deloitte on Charges of Practicing of Law, Wall St. J., May 28, 1998, at B15. A
year later, the complaint was dismissed. See Tom Herman, A Special Summary and Forecast
of Federal and State Tax Developments, Wall St. J., July 29, 1998, at Al; see also William
D. Elliot, Unauthorized Practice of Law: Failure of Proof or Failure of Will, 81 Tax Notes
517 (1998). Tax is an especially treacherous battle-ground to wage unauthorized practice
battles because lawyers and accountants have overlapping jurisdictions in the tax area. See,
e.g., Circular No. 230, 31 C.F.R. 10.3 (2005) (defining who may practice before the Internal
Revenue Service).
54. See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences
Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even Good Sense?, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 159, 180-
81. The classic critique of unauthorized practice provisions is Deborah L. Rhode, Policing
the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized
Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1982).
55. Christensen, supra note 54, at 191-93.
56. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 829-34 (1986).
57. See Susan Hackett, The Corporate Client's Perspective: Legal Services for Clients
Who Do Business in the Twenty-First Century, in Multidisciplinary Practices and
Partnerships: Lawyers, Consultants and Clients, supra note 7, § 12.02(1) (describing the
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While the bar was unable to challenge the provision of legal services by
nonlawyers to corporations through unauthorized practice provisions, it
attempted to address the problem indirectly when the question of loosening
restrictions on multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) arose in the early twenty-
first century. At the time, large professional service firms, which already
employed significant numbers of lawyers as consultants, and large
segments of the legal profession sought to convince the American Bar
Association to eliminate limitations on partnerships and fee sharing among
lawyers, accountants, and others. 58 Although the committee appointed to
study the issue recommended a rule change, opponents of multidisciplinary
practice successfully argued that such partnerships would undermine the
"core values" of the profession, in particular, the duties of loyalty and
confidentiality and the capacity to provide independent judgment. 59 As the
growth of the compliance industry attests, MDP opponents won the battle,
but lost the war. Lawyers have continued to provide law-like services at
large professional service firms and in other partnerships with nonlawyers,
but do it within the framework of consulting. As it turns out, corporations
do not care how their service providers characterize the relationship, so long
as they provide the services that are needed.60
The incentives for corporations to purchase multidisciplinary services are
created by compliance regimes themselves, which in many instances require
American Corporate Counsel Association's position that "clients have the right (and they are
sophisticated enough to exercise it) to choose whatever service providers they wish to
engage to solve their problems"). The bar would also encounter doctrinal difficulties in
claiming that compliance services constitute the practice of law. Since the 1930s, courts and
the bar have struggled and failed to draw a clear boundary between the provision of legal
advice and similar services that do not constitute legal practice. See ABA Comm'n on
NonLawyer Practice, NonLawyer Activity in Law-Related Situations: A Report with
Recommendations 20-22 (1995). The most recent attempt by the bar to delineate the scope
of practice occurred in 2002-03, when Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., then-President of the American
Bar Association, commissioned a task force to develop a model definition of the practice of
law. After a year's study, the task force decided not to propose a comprehensive definition,
but concluded that "each jurisdiction's definition should include the basic premise that the
practice of law is the application of legal principles and judgment to the circumstances or
objectives of another person or entity." ABA, Report of Task Force on the Model Definition
of the Practice of Law 13 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-
def/taskforcerpt_803.pdf. The task force's effort was widely criticized as unfairly broad
and unworkable. See Tamara Loomis, Defining Law Practice, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 9, 2003, at 5.
Even the Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department got involved, suggesting that
the definition of law practice originally proposed by the task force constituted
anticompetitive behavior under the Sherman Act. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Opposes Proposal
to Limit Who May Give LegalAdvice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2003, at A 1l.
58. See ABA, Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates
(1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdpfinalreport.html.
59. See Wendy Davis, ABA Emphatically Rejects MDPs, Nat'l L.J., July 24, 2000, at
A5. For an elaboration of the legal profession's core values in the context of the MDP
debate, see N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Report of Special Committee on Multi-Disciplinary
Practice and Legal Profession, Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession
(1999), available at http://www.law.comell.edu/ethics/mdp.htm.
60. See Hackett, supra note 57, § 12.02 (legal profession should recognize reality that
corporations buy multidisciplinary services as needed).
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the deployment of multidisciplinary expertise. Consider, for example, the
implementation of compliance mechanisms under the anti-money
laundering provisions of the USA Patriot Act.6' It is difficult to view these
mandates as involving isolated questions of legal interpretation requiring
only, or primarily, legal expertise., These provisions require corporations to
integrate into their business operations routinized procedures, checks, and
processes-mechanisms or "controls"--that work automatically,
eliminating, to the extent possible, human fallibility and the opportunity for
undetected misuse, misappropriation, and other malfeasance. To
operationalize these legal requirements, a company must implement
computer-based systems that monitor the flow of money in and out of the
business and detect suspicious transactions. 62 The design of such systems
interweaves legal, financial, and software expertise. In the same vein, the
implementation of self-audit mechanisms under EPA regulations calls for a
mix of legal, environmental, and engineering expertise. 63 The crafting of
effective ethics codes and internal complaint procedures requires not only
legal knowledge, but also managerial expertise about the incentives and
behavior of employees in large organizations. 64  Recognizing that
compliance expertise is not primarily legal, regulations that require the
designation of internal compliance personnel as part of a compliance
program do not specify that the corporate officer or employee in question be
a lawyer or have a law degree.6 5
Current regulation situates compliance services in various
multidisciplinary fields, thus underscoring the permeability of the boundary
between legal and other types of expertise. Lawyers who sell their services
within a consulting model seek to exploit this porousness. So long as they
avoid any appearance that they are offering legal services, ethics rules
suggest that they can safely do SO. 6 6 ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.7, in particular, makes clear that a lawyer must follow the rules
of professional conduct when offering "law-related" services under two
circumstances: (1) if these services are offered in circumstances that are
indistinct from the provision of legal services, or (2) if provided separately,
61. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(2) (Supp. I 2001); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 7262, 7264,
7265 (Supp. II 2002) (financial controls under Sarbanes-Oxley); 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.308,
229.406, 229.401 (2005).
62. As the steps for effective compliance under the OSGs make clear, compliance can
never be fully automated. The regulatory guidance offered under the OSGs, like other
compliance mandates, requires the designation of personnel whose responsibility is
overseeing compliance. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1 (2004).
63. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000) (EPA regulations); Incentives for Self-
Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg.
66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995) (same).
64. Swenson Interview, supra note 36.
65. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1.
66. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct presume that the services provided
by an attorney to a client involve representation. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct
pmbl., R. 1, 2 (2005).
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the lawyer has failed to take measures to ensure that a person obtaining the
law-related services knows that the services are not legal services and do
not carry the protections of the attorney-client relationship. 67  By
implication, this provision allows lawyers in other circumstances to provide
law-related services without being bound by the rules, so long as they are
clear that they are not providing legal services. 68  Like unauthorized
practice prohibitions more generally, Model Rule 3.7 is intended to protect
clients who may become confused about a lawyer's duties with regard to
law-related services, when these are offered alongside legal services. This
risk is almost entirely absent when it is a corporation that is purchasing the
services at issue and dictating the contractual terms that will govern the
relationship.69
In this section, I have described the rise of business consulting and the
more recent appearance of compliance services as a subspecies of
consulting. The next section turns to the question of why lawyers might
want to recast themselves as law consultants. My discussion focuses on the
regulatory incentives that weigh in favor of lawyers' selling their services
within a consulting framework as compared to an attorney-client
relationship and explores these incentives in the specific context of
investigative services. 70 Investigative services have become a booming
market for law consultants as well as lawyers in corporate firms. 71 The
reputational benefits of retaining an elite corporate firm to represent a
corporation and conduct an internal investigation remain high, and
corporate lawyers are likely to continue to control the lions' share of the
investigative market for some time. The regulatory benefits, however, may
be tipping in favor of companies opting out of attorney-client relationships
and hiring law consultants.
67. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 5.7. Under Rule 5.7(b), "law related services" are
"services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are
related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice
of law when provided by a nonlawyer."
68. John S. Dzienkowski & Ronald D. Rotunda, Legal Ethics: Lawyers Deskbook of
Professional Responsibility § 5.7-2 (2006)
69. Professor Linda Galler has suggested that law-related services offered by a lawyer
are governed by the ethics rules. See Linda Galler, Problems in Defining and Controlling the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 773, 778-79 (2002). The language of Rule
5.7 makes clear, however, that the rules only apply in situations where there is a risk of
potential confusion.
70. The focus on regulatory incentives is not meant to exclude other explanations, based
on quality of life, work satisfaction, or pay differential, that might lead lawyers to join
compliance consulting firms over traditional corporate law firms. There is no data on how
these two settings compare across these variables.
7 1. In the criminal context, internal investigations have become a growth area for
defense lawyers, particularly those with prior experience as prosecutors, and many elite law
firms have started to list corporate investigations among the services they offer. See Andrew
Longstreth, Double Agent: In the New Era of Internal Investigations, Defense Lawyers
Have Become Deputy Prosecutors, Am. Law., Feb. 2005, at 68-69. Although they enjoy the
lions' share of the market, firms like Kroll are beginning to make inroads. Id. In the
employment context as well, law consultants are competing with lawyers in law practice.
See Sullivan & Garcia, supra note 3, at 119-20.
2006] 1411
FORDHAMLAWREVIEW
II. REGULATORY INCENTIVES
The capacity to offer legal expertise outside the bounds of attorney-client
relationships affords law consultants significant flexibility in the ways in
which they organize their practice, which can draw on expertise in various
areas, and how they structure their 'relationships with corporate clients.
Law consultants can offer their service within the umbrella of the attorney-
client relationship or outside of it. When law consultants are hired and
supervised by corporate counsel or an outside law firm retained by a
corporation to conduct an investigation, they function as agents of the
company's attorneys. As agents, they offer the same benefits as counsel
who hired them and have the same obligations with regard to the
investigation at hand. 72  Alternatively, law consultants can sell their
investigative services directly to a company. In this second scenario, they
are not constrained by the ethics rules that govern the conduct of counsel
representing a company.73 Because of their flexibility, law consultants are
able to offer investigative services that complement the legal services
offered by attorneys representing corporations. They are also able to
compete with traditional corporate firms in the market for investigative
services by selling these services directly.
Why would a corporate client want to buy investigative services directly
from a law consultant rather than retain counsel? Historically, the benefits
conferred by the attorney-client relationship outweighed the downside of
limits on the attorney's conduct imposed by professional regulation. Recent
regulatory developments regarding the attorney-client privilege and work-
product doctrine in the investigative context have diminished the value of
hiring counsel. Coupled with the benefits of avoiding ethics rules, these
developments have increased the attractiveness to a corporation of hiring a
law consultant to conduct internal investigations instead of using in-house
counsel or an outside law firm.
A. Diminished Benefit of Attorney-Client Relationships
One of the most important benefits to clients of entering into an attorney-
client relationship has been the protections of the attorney-client privilege
and work-product immunity.74 These evidentiary protections, reinforced by
attorneys' concomitant obligation of confidentiality, created a zone of
privacy over many of the internal activities of corporations. Under the
attorney-client privilege, corporate clients are able to shield from discovery
communications with counsel made for the purpose of giving or obtaining
legal advice. 75  In a similar vein, the work-product doctrine protects
72. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
74. Others include the reputational benefits of hiring a lawyer over a consultant. These
may have declined as well.
75. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950).
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materials prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation from
discovery. 76 Unlike natural persons, corporations do not enjoy a right
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Nevertheless, they
have often been able to rely on the attorney-client privilege and work-
product immunity to keep much internal information confidential. The
protections of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine are
more robust than contractual guarantees of confidentiality alone. A person
who has promised to keep information confidential can still be required by
court order to disclose that information. The evidentiary privileges, in
contrast, protect against a person being compelled through formal process
to disclose covered information. 77
During the last two decades of the twentieth century, corporations were
able to invoke the attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity to
prevent discovery of the processes and results of internal investigations
initiated by a company's attorney. In 1981, in Upjohn Co. v. United
States,78 the Supreme Court provided an expansive view of the types of
communications between a company's attorney and its employees that
would be subject to the privilege, rejecting the position that the privilege
only applied to communications between counsel and employees who
controlled the corporation, such as executives and high-level managers. 79
The Court reasoned that a narrow interpretation "not only makes it difficult
for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced
with a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts
of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law."' 80
Although not bound by federal law, many state jurisdictions followed
Upjohn's lead in giving a broad application to the privilege.81 Many courts
have also adopted a broad view of the work-product doctrine, holding that
materials prepared "because of litigation"--even if they were prepared as
part of a business transaction-were covered. 82
Upjohn successfully prevented discovery of employee interviews
conducted at the behest of the company's general counsel for the purpose of
determining whether its employees had engaged in violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. 83 As the Supreme Court emphasized in Upjohn, in
76. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
77. 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2291 (John T.
McNaughton ed., 4th ed. 1961).
78. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
79. Id. at 392.
80. Id.
81. See Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product
Doctrine 106-07 (2001).
82. United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082 (N.D. Cal.
2002); see also In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v.
Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998); Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d
971, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1996); Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252,
1258 (3d Cir. 1993); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984
(4th Cir. 1992).
83. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386-89.
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theory, the privilege only prevents communications from being discovered,
not underlying facts. 84  In practice, things are different. A company's
invocation of the privilege and work-product immunity, coupled with its
prerogative to limit access to employees through the no-contact rule, 85
creates significant obstacles for government authorities or private parties
who seek to uncover corporate wrongdoing. 86
Since the turn of the century, the privilege has been under pressure from
various directions. While the scope of the doctrine itself has not changed,
incentives to waive attorney-client and work-product protections have
increased. Beginning in the late 1990s and escalating with the corporate
scandals of 2001-02, government authorities have become more aggressive
in their oversight of companies suspected of wrongdoing through criminal
investigations and enforcement actions. To facilitate the uncovering of
possible corporate wrongdoing, they have conditioned lenient treatment on
84. Id. at 395-96 (citing Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830,
831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
85. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 4.2 (2005). Rule 4.2 prohibits a lawyer from
contacting a client whom the lawyer knows is represented by counsel in a matter. Applied in
the corporate context, it would arguably prohibit government lawyers from directly
contacting employees who may be involved in a matter under investigation without
permission of counsel that has been retained in the matter. The application of Rule 4.2 to
government lawyers and their agents has been the subject of some controversy. Government
lawyers have long argued that criminal investigations would be severely impeded if they had
to abide by the Rule. See, e.g., Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government (Reno
Rules), 28 C.F.R. § 77.1 (1999). In 1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that the Justice Department did not have the authority to issue rules that superseded the
state ethics rules on this subject. See United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d
1252 (8th Cir. 1998). That same year, Congress passed the McDade Amendment, which
provided that lawyers for the federal government are "subject to State laws and rules, and
local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in
that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in the
State." 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000). Under ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(f), a
lawyer is permitted to request an employee of a client to refrain from voluntarily providing
information to another party so long as the lawyer "reasonably believes that the person's
interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information." Model
Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 3.4(f)(2) (2005). Companies are also able to exert indirect
pressures to discourage employees from cooperating with investigations.
86. In investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecutor is likely to
encounter many obstacles that arise from the nature of the corporation itself. As a
Department of Justice memorandum notes,
It will often be difficult to determine which individual took which action on
behalf of the corporation. Lines of authority and responsibility may be shared
among operating divisions or departments, and records and personnel may be
spread throughout the United States or even among several countries. Where the
criminal conduct continued over an extended period of time, the culpable or
knowledgeable personnel may have been promoted, transferred, or fired, or they
may have quit or retired.
Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components
and U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm [hereinafter
Thompson Memorandum].
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waiver.87 In the employment sphere, the defenses described above create
positive incentives for employers to waive the privilege in connection with
investigations of employees' claims of wrongdoing. 88 The result of these
converging trends is that the attorney-client and work-product protections
are arguably less valuable to corporations than a decade ago.
1. Criminal Investigations and Regulatory Enforcement Actions
Corporations have been under increasing pressure to waive attorney-
client and work-product protections in the context of criminal
investigations. Although the practice of turning over the results of internal
investigations to the government in the hope of avoiding prosecution or
penalties is not new, the pressures have increased. In determining whether
an organization itself should be charged with a crime, its cooperation,
including its willingness to waive privileges, is a factor in the charging
decision. 89 This approach was formally recognized in a memorandum
issued in 1999 by then-Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder and
reaffirmed and expanded four years later.90 In 2004, waiver of privileges
was also recognized in the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines as
a factor supporting a finding that a corporation had cooperated with the
government to qualify for a reduction of sentence.91
87. Report of the American Bar Association's Task Force on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 60 Bus. Law 1029, 1043 (2005) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
88. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
89. Task Force Report, supra note 87, at 1044; Longstreth, supra note 71, at 72.
90. The Holder Memorandum stated,
One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a corporation's
cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary, a waiver
of the attorney-client and work product protections, both with respect to its internal
investigation and with respect to communications between specific officers,
directors, and employees and counsel.
Holder Memorandum, supra note 31, at 192; see also Thompson Memorandum, supra note
86. In the fall of 2006, the waiver provisions of the Thompson Memorandum came under
mounting criticism. See The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in
Corporate Investigations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=2054; Letter from Former Justice
Department Officials to Alberto Gonzales (Sept. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.acca.com/public/attyclientpriv/agsept52006.pdf.
91. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5 (2004). As comment 12 notes,
"Waiver of attorney-client privilege and of work-product protections is not a prerequisite to
a reduction in culpability score ... unless such waiver is necessary in order to provide timely
and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to the organization." Id. cmt. 12
Although the sentencing guidelines are advisory, courts are still required to consider them.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); United States v. Fanfan, 542 U.S. 963 (2004).
In April 2006, the U.S. Sentencing Commission voted to amend the corporate sentencing
guidelines to eliminate the incentive for prosecutors to require disclosure of privileged
information as a condition of receiving credit for cooperating with the government. See
Statement, Michael S. Greco, President, ABA, Re: U.S. Sentencing Commission Vote
Rescinding 2004 Privilege Waiver Amendment (Apr. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.abanews.org/statementsletters/sttwaiver.html.
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Regulatory authorities have pursued analogous policies in other areas. In
2004, the SEC signaled that it would consider a company's waiver of the
attorney-client and work-product privileges in connection with internal
reviews in determining whether to bring an enforcement action against the
company for violations of federal securities laws.92 Taking a similar tact,
the EPA and the DOJ have offered to settle claims of violations of
environmental and other regulatory law in exchange for investigative
reports containing privileged information. 93
The value of the attorney-client privilege has been further diluted by
courts' insistence on a strict approach to waiver in the context of
government investigations. Since the 1990s, corporations, with the support
of government agencies who want to encourage cooperation, have sought to
persuade courts to adopt a selective waiver rule, under which a company
would be able to waive the privilege for purposes of cooperating in a
government investigation without thereby waiving it as to private parties.94
A majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have rejected this
approach, adhering to the view that waiver as to one party-even if the
party is the government and it has entered into a confidentiality agreement
with the corporation-implies waiver as to all parties. 95 As a result, after a
corporation cooperates with the government and discloses privileged
information, it has no capacity in subsequent litigation to safeguard this
information from discovery by private parties.
Investigations have become a booming business for corporate law firms,
but lawyers in these practices no longer conduct internal investigations with
the expectation that they will fall within the protections of the attorney-
client privilege and work-product immunity. To the contrary, many
92. See Securities and Exchange Commission Statement on the Relationship of
Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release. No. 44,969, 76
S.E.C. Docket 296 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
investreport/34-44969.htm; see also Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, The
Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Reflected in the Commission's Enforcement Program,
Remarks at UCLA School of Law (Sept. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092004smc.htm.
93. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d
289 (6th Cir. 2002); Letter from Steven Schell, Partner, Black Helterling LLP, to ABA Task
Force on Attorney-Client Privilege (Feb. 10, 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/publichearing200502 11/testimony/20052 11000
000.pdf.
94. See, e.g., McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Adler, 562 S.E.2d 809, 811-12 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002) (discussing the SEC's amicus brief in support of allowing waiver of the privilege for
purposes of cooperating in its investigation); see also Securities and Exchange Committee
Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, at 45 (2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox704report.pdf (recommending that legislation be
enacted recognizing selective waiver in connection with government investigations).
95. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp, 293 F.3d 289; United States v.
Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997); Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1989); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d
1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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companies are hiring attorneys to oversee investigations in contemplation of
handing over details to the government. 96  In effect, a new type of
investigation practice has emerged.
The transformation of investigative services has created opportunities for
risk consulting firms, which can offer corporate clients significant
flexibility in how investigations are conducted. Consultants and their
clients have two options for structuring their relationship. A law consultant
can be hired by general counsel or a law firm to conduct an investigation to
assist in the formulation of legal advice. In this scenario, the results of the
consultant's investigation is covered by the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine under long-standing doctrine that extends the
privilege to agents of counsel. 97 Conversely, he is subject to the same
duties of confidentiality and avoidance of conflicts as other agents of the
attorney. 98
Alternatively, a law consultant can be hired directly by a company to
conduct an investigation to provide business advice or testify as an expert
witness. In this second scenario, the communications with the law
consultant would not be considered privileged.99  The loss of this
protection, however, would be outweighed by the advantages to the
corporate client and law consultant of avoiding an attorney-client
relationship.' 00 The growing irrelevance of privilege in this area, coupled
with the benefits of escaping the attorney-client relationship, has made it
possible for risk consulting firms to compete-as well as cooperate-with
traditional law firms to provide investigative services.' 01
96. Longstreth, supra note 71, at 70, 72.
97. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
98. Model Rules of Prof'i Conduct R. 5.3 (2005).
99. See, e.g., 2,022 Ranch, L.L.C. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 213-14 (2003)
(finding factual investigations done by an in-house claims adjuster licensed to practice law
not subject to attorney-client privilege); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I
Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-407 (1997).
100. See infra notes 109-30 and accompanying text.
101. Kroll, Inc., Investigations, Financial Advisory and Intelligence,
http://www.krollworldwide.conm/services/ifai (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). Their clients
include not only private multinational corporations, but also state and federal agencies,
foreign financial institutions, and nonprofits. Id.
The attorney-client privilege is also under pressure from auditors who are subject to
heightened obligations to detect wrongdoing in publicly traded companies. Historically, a
tension always existed between an auditor's need to obtain internal information from a
company to attest to its financial statements and a lawyer's obligation to keep information
about the company confidential. The professions resolved this problem through joint
professional standards that allowed auditors to obtain adequate assurances from a company's
attorneys about its potential liabilities while limiting auditors' need to have access to
documents subject to privilege. See Documents Subject to Lawyer-Client Privilege, AU §
9337(4) (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants (AICPA) 1977); ABA, Statement of Policy
Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information 8 (1977), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomeyclient/policies/aicpa.pdf.
In response to the financial reporting scandals that came to light in 2001, new regulations
place an onus on auditors to identify and appropriately address suspected fraud. Under SAS
99, a new standard adopted by the AICPA in 2002, an auditor is required, inter alia, to
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2. Waiver of Privilege in the Employment Law Context
In the employment arena, investigations are also an important dimension
of compliance, functioning as part of a defense to show that an employer
"exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior."' 0 2  Both before and after the Supreme Court's
decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries,
Inc., v. Ellerth, lower courts routinely held that an employer's prompt
workplace investigation of an employee's complaint was a factor in
identify the risk factors signaling possible fraud and respond appropriately. Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, SAS 99, AU § 316 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 2002).
In 2004, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the new agency
charged with overseeing audits of publicly traded companies, issued standards that
encourage more rigorous scrutiny in audits. PCAOB, Auditing and Related Professional
Practice Standards, Auditing Standard No. 2: An Audit of Internal Control over Financial
Reporting Conducted in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements (Mar. 2004);
Auditing Standard No. 3: Audit Documentation (June 2004), available at
http://ww.pcaob.org/Rules/Rules-oftheBoard/AuditingStandard3.pdf; see also
Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU § 9326.22 (Am. Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accountants Apr. 2003) (regarding support for tax matters). For a detailed discussion,
see David M. Brodsky et al., The Auditor's Need for the Client's Detailed Information vs.
The Client's Need to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection:
The Debate, The Problems and Proposed Solutions (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomeyclient/publichearing200502 11/testimony/brodsky2.pd
f, see also Sue Reisinger, Your Papers Please, Corporate Counsel, June 2006, at 78. In
addition, regulators have signaled their intent to scrutinize and sanction auditors that fail to
catch fraud by their clients. See Brodsky et. al, supra, at 4-8; Hackett, supra note 57; Task
Force Report, supra note 87, at 1053. Attorneys themselves may also feel pressure to
disclose privileged information to auditors to avoid liability for "misleading" an accountant
engaged in an audit. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b)(1) (2003); John K. Villa, Audit Letter
Responses in the Wake ofSarbanes-Oxley, ACC Docket., Oct. 2003 at 164, 168.
In this strengthened regulatory climate, auditors are requesting documents that had
previously been considered off limits under the attorney-client privilege or work-product
immunity. Considerable uncertainty exists as to the scope and application of waiver
doctrines in the context of documents provided by attorneys in response to auditor requests.
See Task Force Report, supra note 87. In addition, courts have divided on the issue of
whether the work-product protection is waived in these circumstances. Compare Medinol,
Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing the
waiver of work-product immunity), with Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc.,
229 F.R.D. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Attorneys representing corporations have also been
subject to mounting pressures to reveal client wrongdoing to government authorities. In
2003, the organized securities bar barely defeated an attempt by the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) to enact a rule pursuant to section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley that would
have required lawyers to make a noisy withdrawal to the SEC, if a corporation's board of
directors failed to address a lawyer's report of evidence of fraud. See Susan P. Koniak, When
the HurlyBurly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1236 (2003).
In the wake of the abusive tax shelter problem, Congress enacted section 815 of the
American Jobs Creation Act, which requires lawyers involved in creating and promoting
abusive tax shelters to maintain and disclose client lists to the Internal Revenue Service. See
26 U.S.C.A. §§ 6111, 6112 (West 2005).
102. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998). An employer also had to
show that "the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided." Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
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avoiding vicarious liability for sexual harassment.' 03 Applying a parallel
principle, at least one state court has held that a workplace investigation can
constitute a defense against a claim of wrongful discharge.104
Under well-established doctrine, when an employer asserts as a defense
that it conducted a prompt investigation in response to a harassment
complaint, it is waiving any claims of privilege as to the investigation. In
claiming that it conducted an appropriate investigation, an employer is
putting the details of the investigation at issue and cannot shield any
aspects, including communications with counsel overseeing the
investigation, from discovery.10 5
As with internal investigations of financial improprieties by risk
management consultants, employment law consultants and their clients can
choose whether or not to structure their relationship under the umbrella of
the attorney-client relationship.10 6 Engaging a law consultant with practice
experience to investigate for the purpose of providing business advice or
testifying as an expert witness has no obvious drawbacks and arguably
confers benefits not available in an attorney-client relationship.
B. Advantages of the Consulting Relationship
An important advantage of consulting is that lawyers who are not
representing clients can opt out of professional regulation. As described
above, risk management firms and employment law consultants
characterize their services as consulting, business, or investigative
services.10 7 By describing their work as non-legal, law consultants escape
the broader fiduciary responsibilities that lawyers owe their clients. Their
services do not fall within the ambit of the rules that govern lawyers'
conduct, which presume an attorney-client relationship; nor are law
consultants subject to significant professional liability.' 0 8 Instead, their
obligations are defined by contract and agency law. As a result, consulting
relationships afford clients and lawyers much greater leeway than attorney-
client relationships.
103. Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2001); Dougherty v.
Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 269 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
104. See Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998).
105. See, e.g., Walker v. County of Contra Costa, 227 F.R.D. 529 (N.D. Cal. 2005);
Brownell v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 19 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); Harding v. Dana
Transp., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1084 (D.N.J. 1996).
106. See Sullivan & Garcia, supra note 3, at 122-23.
107. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. Kroll's Web site notes that it advises
clients on how to proceed after it has conducted investigations. See Kroll, Inc., supra note
101.
108. The Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in some version in most states, presume
and are organized around attorney-client relationships.
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1. Advantages to Corporations
The most obvious and significant advantage to corporations is the
capacity to purchase multidisciplinary investigative services from a single
source. Practicing lawyers are subject to rules.that prohibit splitting fees
with nonlawyers, forming partnerships with nonlawyers, and reporting to
nonlawyers. 10 9 These rules limit the organizational forms that firms can
adopt and preclude the appointment of nonlawyers to managerial positions
or as partners. Law consultants are not subject to these constraints and can
organize their practices in the most efficient form, teaming up with
professionals from other disciplines to sell their services. While law firms
are not precluded from hiring nonlawyers, they cannot offer them
managerial positions or partnership.
The capacity to bring in a team with varied expertise has significant
appeal to companies. With the increased complexity of corporate financial
and legal transactions, internal investigations benefit from different
disciplinary competencies. Faced with questionable internal activity that
may span different countries and involve intricate computer and accounting
operations, a large multinational company will want a team of investigators
that includes law enforcement agents, accountants, information technology
experts, intelligence experts, and lawyers.110 Unlike law firms, consulting
firms offer the advantage of firm specific knowledge, which team members
develop by working together over time on different assignments, and enjoy
lower transactions costs that they can pass on as lower prices to clients. 11
A further benefit to corporate clients is the possibility of avoiding
regulation that impinges on lawyers' actions vis-At-vis third parties. The
most salient rule in the context of corporate investigations is the
requirement that, in communicating with employees of a corporate client, a
lawyer must make clear the identity of her client and the client's right to
reveal statements made by employees."12 These "Corporate Miranda" or
"Upjohn" warnings, as they are known, are intended to protect the
109. Model Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 5.4 (2005). The history and justifications for this
prohibition are discussed in Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on
Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications
for the Core Values Debate, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1115 (2000), and Ted Schneyer,
Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and the Anti-Interference Principle in
Legal Ethics, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1469, 1510-14 (2000).
110. See Kroll, Inc. supra note 101; see also James Cox, More Firms Hire Sleuths to
Avoid Nasty Surprises: Due Diligence Checks Become Routine Before Many Corporate
Deals, USA Today, June 26, 2001, at B1. In international investigations, investigative
consulting firms deploy the expertise of "ex-FBI, CIA, IRS, DEA, and Secret Service
Agents; former police, prosecutors, customs agents, federal marshals and military
intelligence experts; veterans of Britain's M16, Europe's Interpol or the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police; and lawyers, forensic accountants, database specialists and journalists." Id.
111. On the value of firm-specific knowledge and skills generally, see Seth D. Harris,
Coase's Paradox and the Inefficiency of Permanent Strike Replacements, 80 Wash. L.Q.
1185, 1250-52 (2002).
112. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.13(f) (2005).
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employee from a lawyer's inappropriate influence. They require a lawyer
to explain that she represents the company not the employee, the attorney-
client privilege belongs to the company, and the company can disclose
anything said by the employee."13 The rule also prohibits an attorney from
giving legal advice to an employee. If the lawyer's warnings are not clear,
she runs the risk of employees' claiming that the attorney-client privilege
belongs to them, or even that the lawyer represented them."l 4 An employee
who refuses to cooperate in an employer's investigation is in danger of
being fired, but the warnings function at the very least to signal to an
employee that his interests may not be aligned with those of his employer
and that he should be cautious about what he reveals.
A law consultant retained to conduct a corporate investigation can
structure his relationship with the company to avoid this requirement. If a
consultant is hired by a law firm to assist in rendering legal advice, he is
required to provide Upjohn warnings, as would any other agent of the
lawyer. 115 But if he is hired directly by the company under the guise of
conducting an investigation for purposes of testifying or to render business
advice, or his work is not directed by the company's general counsel, his
services will not fall within an attorney-client relationship. Since a
consultant does not "represent" a corporate client, he can use his legal
expertise on the client's behalf while appearing independent of its
113. See David Hechler, Know Your Lines: Do You Need to Use a Script When Telling
Employees of Their Rights in an Internal Investigation?, Corporate Counsel, Feb. 2006, at
17.
114. Compare United States v. Hart, No. 92-219, 1992 WL 348425, at *1 (E.D. La. 1992)
(stating that employees of a company who reasonably believed the company's attorneys
were representing them were entitled to assert attorney-client privilege with regard to
disclosures made to attorneys), with E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.
Tex. 1969) (holding that even though the employee reasonably believed his employer's
lawyers represented him, the employee was not entitled to assert the attorney-client privilege
as to communications with lawyers).
115. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-407 (1997). In a
1997 formal opinion, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility considered two possible guises in which a lawyer might be retained by a law
firm as an expert consultant. When a lawyer is hired to provide "expert legal advice" to a
firm and its client in a matter, she occupies the role of cocounsel and is bound by all the
duties that apply to lawyers representing a client. See id. at 1. When, on the other hand, a
lawyer is retained to testify as an expert witness, no attorney-client relationship has been
formed. Agency and other law may govern the lawyer's conduct, but not the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Id.; see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Exxon
Corp., 202 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding that former government attorneys were not
prohibited by ethics rules from testifying as expert witnesses for private parties in connection
with the matter they previously handled on behalf of the government); Estate of Sexton v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Nos. 19418-98, 3076-99, 2003 WL 403063 (U.S. Tax Ct.
2003) (finding that the attorney hired by the IRS to provide an expert report did not represent
the IRS for purposes of determining conflicts of interest). .Investigative consulting firms,
which are not holding themselves out as lawyers, would presumably argue that they do not
offer legal advice and therefore never occupy the role of cocounsel. Their obligations would
therefore be governed exclusively by agency law and the terms of the consulting contract.
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interests.11 6 As HR Magazine notes, because of their legal training and
background, employment law consultants "know the right questions to ask"
and "how to ask questions to elicit the most thorough and relevant
information."11 7 At the same time, they are often viewed as "more neutral
and employee-friendly than the company's outside litigation counsel.", 8
In general, a company will have a stake in having an investigation of
alleged wrongdoing appear independent. When accused of sexual
harassment, an employer will want to persuade a trier of fact (as well as
other employees involved in the incident) that the subsequent investigation
was neutral, prompt, and thorough. 119 In the same vein, a company
suspected of criminal or regulatory violations will want to persuade
government authorities that its investigation was designed to ferret out
improprieties, not hide them.120
An employer's interest in showing that it took prompt action in response
to a charge of wrongdoing, however, will often run counter to an
employee's interests. In a case of suspected employee malfeasance, a
corporation has a strong interest in identifying and isolating an individual
wrongdoer, so that it is absolved of responsibility as a whole. Law
consultants hired by employers will have this interest in mind when
conducting investigations. Because they can appear independent of
corporate interests, they are particularly well suited to elicit damaging
admissions from employees. 121
Law consultants can also elicit information from outside third parties
without operating under the rules that constrain attorneys representing
clients in these situations. Under Rule 4.2, a lawyer representing a client in
a matter cannot communicate with a person whom he knows is represented
by counsel in that matter, and under Rule 4.3, he cannot give the appearance
that he is disinterested when dealing with a person who is not represented
by counsel. These rules reflect the concern that a lawyer, whose tendency
is to put his client's interests first, will unduly influence a third person to
make damaging statements or otherwise act against her own interests.
116. While Rule 1.13(f) is written with an attorney-client relationship in mind, it is
arguably applicable when a law consultant seeks to invoke her authority as a lawyer in her
dealings with employees of the company. Were she to identify herself as a lawyer in such
interactions, she would presumably be required to explain that she was hired by the
employer. Even though she was hired in a consulting capacity, her self-identification as an
attorney would create a risk that an employee would unduly defer to her judgment on the
assumption that the attorney has the employee's interests in mind.
117. See Sullivan & Garcia, supra note 3, at 122.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Longstreth, supra note 71, at 72.
121. A law consultant, like any other person, cannot actively mislead an employee or third
person without running afoul of tort or criminal law. See, e.g., Damon Darlin, Ex-
Chairwoman Among 5 Charged in Hewlitt Case, N.Y. Times., Oct. 5, 2006, at Al. In this
context, tort and criminal law impose lower standards than the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
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There is no reason to think that consultants will not give the same priority
to their clients' interests, but they are not bound by the same prohibitions.
A further benefit of law consultants is their availability to serve as expert
witnesses at trial. Lawyers are not permitted to be advocates on behalf of
clients in cases in which they are likely to be necessary witnesses.12 2 Under
the Rules, if, after conducting an investigation on behalf of a client, a
lawyer's testimony is required in a case, she must forego representing the
client and shift into a different role. In practice, the shift from advocate to
witness makes lawyers uncomfortable, and they avoid the role of witness
whenever they can. 123 Law consultants, in contrast, make it a point of
stressing their expertise in conducting independent investigations under the
assumption that they will present their findings at trial. 124
2. Advantages to Consultants
In addition to the flexibility of multidisciplinary practice, law consultants
enjoy other benefits that flow from the general absence of fiduciary
obligations to clients. Among the more significant of these duties is the
obligation to avoid representing conflicting interests, formalized in the
conflict-of-interest rules. 125  Rules 1.7 and 1.8 proscribe conflicts that
undermine a lawyer's loyalty to a client or impair her capacity for
independent judgment. Rule 1.9, which addresses obligations to former
clients, prohibits representations in which confidential information obtained
from a client in an earlier matter can be used to its disadvantage in the
second matter. 126
Consultants do not labor under the same restrictions. Consider a
corporate investigation undertaken to develop expert testimony for trial. As
a potential witness, a law consultant does not have an obligation to avoid
conflicts with a client after the work for which he has been retained has
been completed. 127 Law consultants who provide business advice have
122. Model Rules of Prof'l Responsibility R. 3.7 (2006).
123. See Longstreth, supra note 71, at 73.
124. See Sullivan & Garcia, supra note 3, at 122 (employment law consultants can serve
as "prepared, professional witnesses"); see, e.g., Kroll Worldwide, Case Studies,
http:/iwww.krollworldwide.com/services/investigations/case-studies/ (last visited Nov. 8,
2006).
125. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 3.7 (2005).
126. Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 1.10(a) applies most of these prohibitions to
lawyers working in the same firm. Although Rule 1.9 is less concerned with loyalty than
with the misuse of confidential information, a residual concern for loyalty remains in the
prohibition against a lawyer's taking on a representation against a former client that involves
work done on its behalf. See Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 1.10(a) cmt. 1.
127. A lawyer who is employed as an expert witness by a client does not assume the
duties implicit in an attorney-client relationship and is not bound by the rules prohibiting
conflicted representation. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op.
97-407 (1997). A lawyer who first represents a client and then later becomes an expert in
litigation against the former client is in a different situation. In this second scenario, the
lawyer continues to have residual obligations to the former client. See Patriot Scientific
Corp. v. Moore, 178 F. App'x 18 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (disqualifying a lawyer who represented a
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available an analogous argument that because they are not providing legal
representation, they are not required to follow the conflict rules.
Consulting firms will often abide by the prohibitions against conflicts. In
many matters, consultants are acting as agents of law firms and are
therefore required to follow the ethics rules; in other matters, it is good
business sense to avoid conflicts that .can compromise long-standing
relationships. Generally, though, consultants enjoy greater flexibility
around conflicts. To the extent that conflict rules are intended to protect
clients' interests in safeguarding confidential information, corporate clients
protect these interests in the consulting context by requiring consultants to
agree to confidentiality provisions.
A final important benefit to law consultants is the ability they likely
enjoy to avoid malpractice liability. Courts have not addressed the specific
question of whether law consultants can be sued for malpractice, but the
principles that underlie the development of professional liability suggest
that if courts are confronted with the issue they will likely hold that law
consultants are not subject to suit in tort. Professional malpractice is a
long-standing exception to the basic principle that a service purchaser's
remedy for failure to provide the services agreed upon lies exclusively in
contract. Courts have recognized an exception for professional liability
because lawyers and other professionals have fiduciary responsibilities to
clients that stem from the special role and status afforded these professions
in American society. Applying this logic, courts have generally refrained
from holding that consultants are subject to suit for malpractice. In the
computer consulting context, for example, they have tended to hold that the
exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs is contractual. 128 Courts have
reasoned that computer consultants are not liable in tort because computer
consulting lacks the characteristics of a recognized profession. In
particular, it lacks a shared requirement of formal training, state licensing
standards and enforceable ethics codes. 129  The absence of these
characteristics makes it difficult to determine an appropriate standard of
care or to infer a fiduciary relationship, which is the traditional basis for
finding professional liability. 130  This same analysis applies to law
former client in a patent dispute from serving as an expert witness in a related case against
the former client).
128. See, e.g., Hosp. Computer Sys. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351 (D.N.J.
1992); Analysts Int'l Corp. v. Recycled Paper Prod., Inc., No. 85 C 8637, 1987 WL 12917
(N.D. Ill. 1987); Richard A. Rosenblatt & Co. v. Davidge Data Sys. Corp., 743 N.Y.S.2d
471 (App. Div. 2002); RKB Enters. v. Ernst & Young, 582 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. Div. 1992).
In some cases, courts have held that professionals who provide consulting alongside
professional services are liable for violation of professional standards of care. See
Diversified Graphics Ltd. v. Groves, 868 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding an accounting
firm providing computer consulting services liable for violations of accounting professional
standards); Fort Wash. Res. v. Tannen, 846 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding a doctor
providing consulting services liable for violation of medical standards of care).
129. See Hosp. Computer Sys., 788 F. Supp. at 1361.
130. The formal characteristics that define professional status give rise to the fiduciary
obligations owed by professionals to their clients. In general, courts find fiduciary
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consultants who-like consultants more generally--do not assume
fiduciary duties to their clients but define their obligations to clients through
contract.
III. THE RISE OF LAW CONSULTANTS: SOME IMPLICATIONS
Today, corporate lawyers practicing in firms continue to provide most
law-related services to corporations. 131 But some day, perhaps in the not
too distant future, corporations may decide that it is in their interest to
purchase legal services in a form that is unbundled from attorney-client
relationships. As one corporate counsel has emphasized, "Clients
increasingly understand that they don't have to hire or retain lawyers if they
are not serving their needs well." 132 The emergence of law consultants
makes it clear that the attorney-client relationship in the corporate context is
not a necessary feature of the American legal landscape. To the contrary, it
is the product of laws that require corporations to retain lawyers to conduct
certain kinds of business or confer other benefits to corporations when they
enter into attorney-client relationships. With the rise of compliance
regulatory regimes, there are vast areas of corporate regulation that may end
up ceded to compliance consultants. In the long run, law consultants, with
their ready access to multidisciplinary expertise, may be better suited to
assist corporations in responding to the demands created by these regulatory
regimes.
The rise of a law consulting regime benefits corporations, who can
purchase useful multidisciplinary expertise at less cost and replicate the
protections offered by attorney-client relationships through contractual
provisions. Third parties may not fare as well. Unlike lawyers who
represent clients, law consultants are not required to refrain from using their
expertise and authority in ways that may harm the interests of employees
and other third parties. But, assuming that this is a serious risk, it is
difficult to envision a successful regulatory strategy to address it. The bar
might seek-in the name of protecting third parties-to reframe the
meaning of legal practice more broadly so as to encompass the activities of
law consulting. There is little evidence, however, that the current rules
provides meaningful protection to third parties from undue influence of
lawyers. Proposing an expanded definition of law practice would also meet
significant resistance on a variety of other grounds, including its detrimental
relationships between commercial parties when there is unequal bargaining power between
the parties and an unusual degree of dependency and trust. Educational requirements,
licensing, and an ethics code engender a degree of trust in a professional that removes the
relationship from the realm of conventional contractual dealings. See Richard A. Glaser &
Leslee M. Lewis, Redefining the Professional: The Policies and Unregulated Development
of Consultant Malpractice Liability, 72 U. Det. Mercy. L. Rev. 563, 573-80 (1995).
13 1. This is at best an educated guess. As mentioned earlier, there are no data that break
out compliance consulting services from all consulting services purchased by corporations.
We accordingly do not know whether companies are spending more on traditional legal
services or compliance consulting services.
132. Hackett, supra note 57, § 12.12(1).
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effects on the capacity of the public to obtain access to the legal system.
Given the long history of failed attempts to define law practice broadly, a
move by the bar to bring law consulting under the umbrella of law practice
is not likely to be successful. 133
An alternative approach would be to regulate law consulting separately.
It is difficult to imagine, though, where the political will to enact such
regulation would originate. Historically, consultants have shown no interest
in creating or participating in a regulatory regime, and there are no signs
that that this has changed. Without their collaboration, the imposition of a
regulatory framework from above is not likely to work.
A final consideration is the effect of law consulting on legal compliance
by corporations. In recent months, the corporate bar has sought to reassert
its central role in eliciting lawful corporate behavior in response to
government attempts to weaken the value of the attorney-client privilege.
In the spring of 2005, a task force of the ABA issued a widely circulated
report that emphasized the privilege and work-product doctrine. 134 In April
2006, corporate lawyers convinced the Federal Sentencing Commission to
alter the OSGs so that waiver of the privilege was no longer considered a
condition of cooperation; and in September 2006, the Senate Judiciary
Committee conducted hearings during which the Justice Department's
approach, formalized in the Thompson Memorandum, was roundly
criticized by witnesses, including prominent members of the corporate bar,
and members of the committee itself.135
As the arguments advanced by the corporate bar reveal, the importance of
the attorney-client privilege is premised on its capacity to further social
values. The privilege not only exists to assist counsel in formulating legal
advice; it is also intended to create a zone of privacy that lawyers are
supposed to use to convince corporate clients to abide by the law. 136
According to the bar, the privilege encourages corporate employees to be
forthcoming with lawyers, who can, in turn, give informed advice to the
company and assist it in its good faith attempts to comply with the law. 137
The argument for strengthening privilege relies on one model of legal
compliance under which attorneys mediate between legal mandates and
their clients' interests to persuade clients to engage in law-abiding behavior.
Under this traditional model, corporate lawyers are assumed to take an
internal perspective on law-in which they engage in a good faith attempt
to interpret laws consistent with their purposes-and convince their clients
133. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
134. See Task Force Report, supra note 87.
135. During the hearing, Deputy-Attorney General Paul McNulty assured the committee
that the department would revisit its policies with a view to revising those that impinge on
the attorney-client privilege. See The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to
Counsel in Corporate Investigations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5,
10 (2006) (testimony of Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty).
136. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). For the classic critique, see
Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1998).
137. Task Force Report, supra note 87.
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to do likewise. The view that lawyers and their clients are fundamentally
inclined to respect law has become increasingly discredited as each new
corporate scandal has come to light. Starting with Enron and continuing
with Adelphia, Global Crossing, Livent, Qwest, TV Azteca, and Waste
Management-to name just a few-lawyers have been found to be
complicit in corporate wrongdoing, either by actively assisting their clients
to break the law or turning a blind eye. In response to this wave, the
organized bar has done little more than advance rationalizations to absolve
the lawyers involved from responsibility.138 Given this recent history, it is
not surprising that regulatory authorities continue to experiment with a
different model.
This alternative model, suggested by many regulatory regimes, requires
that companies provide a form of self-executing compliance throughout
their business operations. Under this model, compliance functions are no
longer centralized but dispersed throughout the company through the
designation of appropriate compliance personnel and the promulgation of
self-audit mechanisms, ethics codes, and complaint procedures that
effectively delegate compliance responsibilities to all employees. While a
lawyer representing the company may have an important role in assuring
that appropriate compliance mechanisms are implemented, overseeing a
company's compliance functions does not fall under the mantle of corporate
counseling, as once understood.
The question of whether lawyers and other employees who are
responsible for instituting compliance mechanisms inside corporations take
an internal or external perspective on the law may not make sense under
this second model. As compliance functions become disseminated and
dispersed inside large organizations, the discourse in which they are framed
is likely to assume characteristics drawn from other areas of expertise. In
particular, this discourse is likely to incorporate criteria of validity that look
quite different from attempts to discern the meaning of law. 139 Whether a
company has instituted effective financial controls under Sarbanes-Oxley,
for example, may be less a question of whether the company's lawyer has
interpreted the statute correctly and more a question of how the company's
financial oversight systems measure against criteria of effectiveness
borrowed from accounting and computer science: Is the company using the
most effective software to track its monetary activities? By requiring the
internalization of compliance inside organizations, these regulatory regimes
dissolve the line between legal and other types of expertise. If, as I suggest,
compliance regimes generate a multidisciplinary discourse whose primary
site is not law, then the question of whether a law consulting regime is
138. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: Counselor After Enron, 35
Conn. L. Rev. 1185, 1189, 1195-97 (2003); see also Koniak, supra note 101.
139. As Lauren Edelman has shown, in the human resources area, legal mandates
focusing on racial, gender, and ethnic diversity have been translated into a managerial
discourse that emphasizes intersubjective differences, many of which are not recognized
legally. See Edelman, supra note 12.
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likely to strengthen or undermine law abiding behavior by corporations
cannot be separated from the larger question of whether the new style of
corporate governance reflected in the compliance movement is effective in
eliciting meaningful compliance with legal mandates. My guess is that the
answer depends on the specific compliance methods involved as well as the
substantive context, but I leave this issue to another day.
